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Abstract 
 
Bond markets in emerging markets are illiquid as investors and issuers grapple with major 
microstructure and legal issues. The importance of bond markets as a source of finance has increased 
during the economic slowdown as companies diversified away from reliance on banks for funding and 
many governments increased borrowing to fund the economic slowdown in their countries. Indian 
corporate bonds market is very illiquid vis-à-vis the Government securities market and heavily rely on 
AAA rated bonds for both issuance and trading. The data dissemination provided in public domain is 
inadequate to effectively price bonds taking all risks into account. Bank bonds demand hefty premia 
from investors and they are considered almost risk free with low credit spread. Investors use Credit 
rating information to price bonds in the market. Indian corporate sector is fast moving to international 
markets to raise funds through ECB / FCCB route though FCCB funding has dried up due to bad equity 
market conditions. Issuance market has remained concentrated with few issuers dominating the market. 
Financial companies like Non-Banking Finance companies dominate the market with issuances. The 
study did not find any significant relationship of coupon with optionality of the bond but it found that 
the Rating has significant relationship with coupon. Lower maturity bonds were having comparatively 
higher coupon than long maturity bonds. This may be possible as the year 2011-12 witnessed 
unprecedented liquidity scarcity in the Indian market and rolling over a debt was considered costly and 
investors demanded higher premia to fund short term bonds. While trading, investors demanded a 
higher premia for taking investment decision on bonds having floating rate. The relation between Rating 
class and yield was also found to be rational as higher yield were demanded on bonds with lower rating. 
The probability of default is higher at the shorter end and the same falls at the longer end. The reason 
may be the uncertainty existing in the short term with respect to liquidity and other macroeconomic 
factors might be warranting higher probability of default to be factored in yields. The study finds that 
the market used the past spreads to price the credit spread they would charge on corporate bonds while 
trading in the market. 
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Indian Corporate Bonds Market –An Analytical Prospective 
 
Golaka C Nath 
 
 
 
Global bond market stood at US$95trillion as of 2010 out of which 70% accounted for domestic bonds. 
The US was the largest market with 38% of the value outstanding, followed by Japan 20%. Government 
bonds accounted for 57% of the outstanding value of domestic bonds in 2010.Greece’s credit rating has 
been downgraded a number of times. Other countries with high budget deficits such as Portugal, 
Ireland, Turkey, Italy and Spain have also seen downgrades. Increasing concern about the ability of some 
governments’ to repay their debt, has resulted in a significant widening of government bond yields. 
Recently, 10-year Spanish Government bonds reached 6% mark which is considered very high.  
According to Dealogic, book runners’ deal volume from global debt capital markets totalled $6.05 trillion 
in 2010, down 2% from the previous year but nearly 40% up on the volume two years earlier. In relation 
to the size of the economy, in Europe, public sector debt is highest in Greece (134% of GDP), Italy 
(119%), Portugal (91%) and Ireland (87%). Net government debt is set to increase in the next few years 
due to the high level of projected government borrowing in many countries. The US corporate bond 
markets have long been an important source of capital for issuers, with daily trading volume of $16bn 
and more than 400 mutual funds investing in US high-yield bonds. 
 
Discussion on Indian corporate bond market has been going on for ages and in each and every forum, 
the need for developing the corporate bond market as an alternative funding arrangement is well 
understood and acknowledged. Both Government and Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) have set 
up many Groups, Committees, and Forums to study and discuss the issue for finding out a workable 
solution. The Dr. R H Patil Committee report (2005) presented a reasonable solution and roadmap for 
kick-starting this form of the market to fulfill the future need of the Industry in funding investment. 
Almost 7 years have passed after the report was made public, not much headway has been achieved. 
Some of the issues like unification of stamp duties on creating charges for securitized debt have been 
contentious issues and no solution has been found to take this market to the place where it belongs. 
Unlike other countries, a large chunk of corporate funding In India is done through banking, retained 
earnings and capital through equity offerings. Corporate bonds contribute fairly little in terms of long 
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term funding. Most of the studies on Indian bond market centered on issues pertaining to the market 
microstructure issues and other bottlenecks in the market specifically cost related ones.  
 
Recently, Government introduced specialized regimes for a corporate bond market in the infra sector. 
Government allowed tax benefits (Budget, 2010) on infra investment upto a limit for tax payers. Key 
motivation for investing in debt market is tax saving for tax payers.   
 
The paper tries to understand the basic structure of Indian corporate Bond market, legal and regulatory 
issues delaying the development of the corporate bond market in India, its issuance and trading 
behavior, pricing of risk, structure of probability of default of the corporate bonds, the behavior of credit 
spread. The paper is divided into few sections: Section 1 gives the brief background to develop 
corporate bond market in Emerging market like India; Section 2 gives Regulatory and Operational 
Framework of Indian Corporate Debt Market; Section 3 discusses about Market Participants from both 
Supply side and demand Side and challenges they face; Section 4 discusses about some of the 
challenging issues with respect to data and market structure; Section 5 discusses about current market 
dynamics; Section 6 discusses the structure of probability of default in corporate bonds in India; Section 
7 analyses the corporate credit spread for AAA rated securities and Section 8 draws the final conclusion 
of the study. 
 
1. Corporate Bond Market Need: 
In any economy, equity and debt are two useful sources of financing for corporates. It caters to investors 
having different risk appetites and requirements. When a firm cannot finance its activities solely through 
equity, it must look at debt financing to support its activities and support development and growth 
(Allen, Kraakman and Subramaniam, 2009). Equity investors have generally a smaller time frame of 
investment but debt investors are long term investors in a firm. This debt is funded through bank loans 
and bond issuances. A liquid bond market helps an economic entity to raise funds at cheaper cost vis-à-
vis syndicated loan from banks (Mishkin, 2006). The liquid bond market helps investor to convert their 
holdings into cash as there are others who would like to take the risk of investing in bonds if the return 
is appropriate for them to assume such risk. The secondary market trading also provides important 
information not only on price but also on many other factors like credit risk appetite, spread, default 
probability, etc. The tradability of bonds issued by an issuer helps the market in getting required 
information on the firm (Mishkin, 2006). Further, development of Credit Default Swap (CDS) market 
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globally also helped in unbundling the risk and reselling the same at appropriate rate. In India, CDS 
market has been introduced but lacks liquidity.  
In India, most of the financial markets like equity, equity derivatives, currency derivatives, commodity 
derivatives, Government bonds, money and currency market including OTC currency derivatives, OTC 
interest rate derivatives are relatively well developed while corporate bond market is not a well-
developed market. This is in contrast to other developed and emerging markets in the world. India's 
corporate bond market, about 30 percent the size of China's, is failing to expand at the rate analysts say 
is needed for the government to meet its target of building infrastructure. India has about $200 billion 
of corporate bonds outstanding (Bloomberg) compared with China's corporate bond market of $614 
billion, according to Asian Development Bank figures (2011). The corporate bond market has been wary 
of the large government borrowing program crowding out the market and a new SEBI law on rollover of 
limits limiting FII participation. SEBI introduced restrictions on rollover of limits if bonds are sold before 
maturity. FII’s who have filled up the corporate bond limits and want to sell the bonds will not be able to 
buy them back as they have to apply for  fresh limits from the regulator. Both SEBI and RBI allowed FIIs 
to invest in long term unlisted NCDs issued by companies in the infrastructure sector (“Infra Bonds”) 
provided that the Infra Bonds have a minimum residual maturity of five years and are subject to a 
minimum lock-in period of one/ three years during which the FIIs will be allowed to trade amongst 
themselves but cannot sell to domestic investors and are subject to certain prescribed limits. The recent 
tussle on tax issues between FII’s and the government is also hurting sentiments on FII investments in 
bonds. A weakening Rupee does not help either, as a weak currency is a deterrent for investments in 
debt by FII’s. The government has set the cumulative debt investment limit in corporate bonds 
(including Infra Bonds) for FIIs at US$45 billion and at US$15 billion in government securities.  
 
Corporate bonds account for about 2% of GDP (Khanna & Varottil, 2012) and equity market is many 
notches ahead of corporate bond market in this regard. Total issuances have been far lower than the 
Government securities issuances in India (Table - 1). 
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Table – 1: Issuances of Bonds – Corporate Bonds and Government Securities in India 
Month  
No. of 
Issues 
Private 
Placement 
Amount 
(Rs.Cr) 
 Public 
Issues 
Amount 
(Rs.Cr) 
 Total 
Issues 
 Amount 
(Rs.Cr) 
Government 
Securities 
Maturity 
Upto*** 
Government 
Securities** 
Amount  
(Rs.Cr) 
2007‐08  744 118484.6 0 0 744 118484.6 30 years 188205 
2008‐09  1041 173281.2 1 1500 1042 174781.2 30 years 306550 
2009‐10  1278 212634.9 3 2500 1281 215134.9 30 years 459497 
2010‐11  1404 218785.4 10 9451 1414 228236.4 30 years 479482 
2011-12  1404* 188530.5* 12* 15045.84* 1416* 203576.3* 30 years 600409 
Source: SEBI, CCIL; * indicates data upto Dec 2011, ** indicates Dated securities and 364-day T-bills,  
*** indicates large number of issuances were re-issued Government securities  
Note: 1 Crore means 10,000,000 (10 million) and in India, April to March is followed as a Financial Year 
 
 Secondary market has remained relatively illiquid vis-à-vis the Government securities market. Other 
markets in India have grown in terms of their trading activities while corporate bonds have remained 
dormant with lower level of activity (Table – 2).  
 
Table – 2: Trading activity in various Markets in India 
Month 
Corp 
Bond 
Trades 
 Corp 
Bond 
Value 
(Rs.Cr) 
Gilts 
Trades 
Gilts  
Amount 
(Rs.Cr) 
Forex 
Deals 
Forex 
Deal 
Value U$ 
Mn 
Repo & 
Repo 
Variant 
Deals 
Repo & 
Repo 
Variant 
Value 
(Rs.Cr) 
2007‐08  19079 95890 188843 1653851 757074 3133665 139889 12059579 
2008‐09  22683 148166 245964 2160233 837520 3758904 143221 12919070 
2009‐10  38230 401198 316956 2913890 883949 2988971 170703 21614207 
2010‐11  44060 605274 332540 2870952 1150037 4191037 172792 16359029 
2011-12 51439 591979 412266 3488203 1283178 4642573 173755 14919125 
Source: SEBI, CCIL 
 
2. Regulatory and Operational Framework of Indian Corporate Debt Market: 
 
In a recent paper on Indian corporate bond market, Khanna & Varottil (2012) have brought out few 
impending legal issues that have been coming in the way of developing corporate bond market in India.  
 
 Contract Enforcement: Given the Indian legal system’s unusual delay in giving appropriate relief 
to enforce the contract of debt with regard to payment of periodic interest, enforcing collaterals 
against the debt, bankruptcy, etc. poses serious challenges to attract right kind of investors in 
the corporate debt market. Prohibitive cost of bring civil action is also another deterrent 
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(Krishnan, 2010, Khanna, 2010). Borrowers take advantage of the situation in denying remedies 
to the lenders. World Bank has consecutively ranked India for the last two years at 182 and 183 
against the parameter of enforcement of contracts (Doing Business Report, World Bank, 2012). 
 Insolvency Regime: Liquidation process (an important provision of debt contract) is fraught with 
significant delays and can take up to 10 years for a company (Shroff & Puri, 2006). Board for 
Industrial & Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) has been unsuccessful in ensuring timely recovery 
and rehabilitation (Shroff & Puri, 2006). The Corporate Debt Restructuring (CDR) scheme 
introduced by RBI to bypass the unusual legal delays in judicial system has not been very 
successful either (Bhoir, 2012). Foreign lenders are not covered under the scheme. The 
insolvency regime is spread over several pieces of legislation and among different course and 
regulatory bodies and this poses serious challenges and does not sound to be cost effective. In a 
recent communique to the Banks from Government of India in April 2012, it has advised banks 
to restrict exposure to quasi securities like convertible preference (Cumulative Convertible 
Preference Shares (CCPS)) shares that have a long tenure, low returns and high provisioning. 
During 2011-12, disress loans of Rs.6697crores were converted into quasi-equity as against 
Rs.562crores in the previous year.  
 Standardization and Transparency: It is imperative in a financial market that investors have 
sufficient information to price an asset while trading the same. Disclosure standards should be 
standardized in a manner that brings transparency to the instrument. In India, foreign investors 
have to follow a different set of guidelines vis-à-vis their domestic counterparts. The current 
regime is considered insufficient and further steps need to be taken to make the market more 
attractive to all investors (Adikesavan, 2011). Standardization is important for liquidity in the 
market. The facility of shelf prospectus and ‘on-tap” issuances are limited to few entities and 
hence private placement route with limited disclosures is the cheaper option for the companies 
to raise debt in the market. No other foreign institutions except SEBI registered FIIs are eligible 
to invest in corporate bonds.  
 
Given the regulatory framework at present, serious structural changes and suitable legal reforms are 
needed to provide a strong legal basis to the Indian debt market. Creating better market infrastructure 
like technology platforms, clearing corporations, etc. are going to help to some extent but legal 
framework will address issues from a long term prospective and help creating a robust market place. 
Further, Indian capital market (equity, corporate bonds, other exchange traded products) lacks the 
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“Finality of Settlement” statutory provisions as it has been kept outside the purview of Payment and 
Settlement Systems Act, 2009.  
 
Prior studies have established many factors contributing to the slow pace of developments in corporate 
bond market. Though Debt Recovery Tribunals (DRTs) were established as per a piece of legislation in 
1993, the enactment came only in 2002. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and 
Enforcement of Security Interests Act, 2002 (SARFARESI) brought lot of relief to banks and financial 
institutions and gave an option for banks to exit their exposures and also helped in providing better 
credit protection to these credit providers. However, the same was not extended to bond investors. 
Armour & Lele (2009) have suggested that the bond issuance dropped considerably between 2001 and 
2008 while loans extended by banks increased considerably during the period. They have pointed out 
that equity market reforms have largely been in the regulatory space and can be easily reformed and 
implemented by regulators who are formed as agencies of the Government while bond market reforms 
are more in legislative space and difficult to speed up the process. Implementation and enforcement are 
faster for equity through SEBI while the same may not be true for corporate bonds which required 
substantial legislative action like unification of stamp duties, better credit protection provisions, and 
efficient bankruptcy management, etc. Investors investing in bonds and issuers issuing the bonds have 
to find ways to overcome the relevant tricky issues in the system. The Patil Committee Report has 
brought out in detail the issues with regard to securitization in India as a viable economic activity. 
Securitization market is a very large market globally as it allows investors to repackage the assets in the 
books and sell them as bonds with different rating classes. This helps them to recycle funds in the 
balance sheet. The securitization model heavily depends on the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) as most of 
the transactions are “Pass Through”. The SPVs must be tax efficient. In India, most SPVs are managed as 
trusts purely from Tax angle. If the SPVs business is done by a professional corporate entity, the entire 
inflows may be treated as revenue for Tax purpose. This will make corporate SPVs inefficient and hence 
model is to have SPVs in the lines of Trusts. However, it is understood that a declaration is needed to be 
obtained from the investors about the possible future tax liability, if any. In Indian context, the trust 
deeds may permit the trustees the right of indemnity against taxation, but first, the trust deeds may not 
be specific as to which beneficiaries to claim such tax on, and two, the beneficiaries may also have gone 
out of the trust. If the beneficiary ceases to be a beneficiary altogether, it would be questionable 
whether the trustees’ indemnity at all extends. (Kothari, 2012) 
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It seems, tax officers have served notices and demands on trustees of Securitization vehicles (SPVs) 
taxing the entire income of such vehicles. This will have serious implications for the market. If the 
investors in an SPV (like a Mutual Fund) have already distributed the funds among the unit holders, can 
they be taxed now?  This has given some amount of uncertainty to the market which is under 
considerable stress. 
 
No corporate debt market can be successful without the development of securitized debt. Globally 
securitized debt forms the major support system of corporate debt market.  In 2006, RBI guidelines on 
the rated and tradable securitization market (commonly called the pass-through certificate or PTC) 
helped to move the market towards bilateral sales of loans or portfolios (commonly called “direct 
assignments”). RBI’s earlier draft guidelines (2010) on minimum risk retention requirements and 
minimum holding period requirements both for bilateral assignments and tradable Securitization paper 
have now become the actual guidelines (May 7, 2012) except some changes pertain to Minimum 
Holding Period (MHP) requirement and credit enhancement reset. These requirements are not expected 
to have any major impact on the Securitization or assignment of any underlying asset class, as these are 
relatively easy to comply with. The biggest impact of the Guidelines is expected to be on Direct 
Assignment transactions that formed about 75% of the market in FY2012. Under the Guidelines, no 
credit enhancement is permitted for these transactions. Given the prohibition on credit enhancement, 
the investing banks will be exposed to the entire credit risk on the assigned portfolio, which most banks 
may not be comfortable with. Hence the volume of such assignment transactions is expected to be 
severely affected.  
 
3. Market Participants: 
 
There are supply and demand side issues in corporate bond market. The most important supply side 
issue is dominance of government-owned companies in the market. The debt market in India is 
dominated by the Government in term of huge issuances. The high level of Government borrowing is 
crowding out the corporate sector to some extent (Luengnaruemitchai & Ong, 2005). During last few 
years, Government borrowing in India has been on the rise at an average rate of about 19% during last 6 
years or so. The borrowings have increased after the onset of financial crisis and during 2011-12, the 
percentage growth of borrowing has surpassed earlier years (Table -3). 
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Table – 3: Outstanding Debt of Government 
Amount in Rs. Crore 
Year Gilts T-Bills Total Outstanding Borrowing Net Increase Growth (%) 
(A) (B) (C) (D=B+C) (E)  (F) 
Mar-06 1018621 70906 1089527     
Mar-07 1181604 115474 1297077 207550 19.05 
Mar-08 1434086 136140 1570226 273149 21.06 
Mar-09 1706083 150274 1856357 286130 18.22 
Mar-10 2033452 137466 2170918 314562 16.95 
Mar-11 2349966 141327 2491293 320374 14.76 
Mar-12 2782985 263996 3046981 555689 22.31 
Source: CCIL 
The gross borrowing of the Government through dated securities alone stood at Rs.5,10,000Crores, Cash 
Management bills accounted for Rs.93,000Crores. 91-day T-Bills accounted for Rs.4,46,803Crores, 182-
day T-bills accounted for Rs.93,601crores and 364-day T-bills accounted for Rs.90,409crores in 2011-12. 
With regard to secondary market, Government securities outright deals settlement stood at 
Rs.34,88,203crores for 2010-12 while corporate bonds were only about one-sixth of the same at about 
Rs.591979crores. In terms of liquidity, Government securities market is far ahead of the corporate 
bonds. This may be due to regulatory provisions for Banks to hold Government securities as per their 
Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) requirements as well as preference for holding risk free sovereign assets 
as a part of diversification mechanism and liquidity management as Government securities have a highly 
liquid repo market. Though repo in corporate bonds is permitted in India for last few years, only 4 trades 
have been reported on the said market. Investors’ preference for holding sovereign assets in India vis-à-
vis corporate bonds reflects the weak credit risk management structure in India which may be due to 
some of the weak legal provisions in regard to credit protection and delay in disposal bankruptcy cases. 
 
Most of the issuers of the bonds are typically Public Sector Units – predominantly owned and controlled 
by Government. These entities find it easier to sell their bonds as they are also perceived as sovereign 
entities with tacit and perceived guarantee on such borrowings. This provides an immense comfort to 
the investors with respect to possible bankruptcy that may require higher provisioning. Investing in 
these entities is a workaround to avoid legal impediments (Khanna & Varottil, 2012).  
 
Major bonds issuances in India are done through private placement route. The private placement route 
requires little disclosures as the market is confined to qualified institutional investors and cheaper vis-à-
vis public issuances. The private placement document is generally a brief document that gives brief 
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details of the issue and the company issuing the bond. As per RBI requirement for Banks investing in the 
said bonds, investing banks must have the copy of the private placed document along with the bond. 
After such RBI notification, the private placement documents started to carry more information that is 
useful to bond investors. Public issue of debt has been tried out in few cases in recent times but the 
same is less cost effective vis-à-vis private placement. SEBI has, of late, made many investor and issuer 
friendly changes to public issuance of debt but the same has not been the preferred route as investors 
are limited to banks and institutions.  Unlike a prospectus for public issuances, private placement does 
not require any statutory disclosure. Since retail investors are absent in this form of the market, private 
placement has remained the most preferred route for issuers. Since bonds are privately placed with 
institutional investors, the secondary market liquidity is limited as most of the investors generally hold 
the bonds till maturity as they have already assumed the risk and the bonds are held in the mark to 
market category of investment (Held for Trading).  
 
Sound Indian Firms have been trying to raise resources through bonds sell in international markets. 
These issuances have been done through ECB and FCCB route. The ECB guidelines put restrictions 
amount to be borrowed, cost of such borrowing, tenure and end-use while FCCB comes under FDI 
regulations and gives advantages to the issuers.  FCCBs allow for convertibility which make is attractive 
to both issuer and investor.  ECB does not allow convertibility. Strong and financially sound companies 
have raised resources through ECBs while FCCBs have been issued by companies across the spectrum 
(Babu & Sandhya, 2009). These issuances are also in the nature of private placement but they are not 
locally issued. A falling market does not augur well for FCCB market as few investors will convert their 
bonds into equities. In 2011-12, most of the international bond issuances by Indian companies have 
been done through ECB route. During 2011-12, only 12 companies issued FCCB amounting 
US$1.067billion while there were 1060 ECB issues with US$33.90billion (US$34.90billion including ECB 
(Bonds) route (US$1billion)).  
 
The investors in the corporate bond market are predominantly banks and institutions including FIIs with 
very little or negligible part played by retail investors. Most of the investors prefer to invest in Sovereign 
bonds rather than corporate bonds due to the risk factor and legal impediments discussed in this paper. 
Pension Funds and Insurance companies prefer Government securities as they have to provide safe and 
guaranteed returns. Further unavailability of risk transfer mechanism in the corporate bond market also 
works as a deterrent. The secondary market in corporate bonds is fraught with many issues: 
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 Multiple reporting systems – For corporate bonds, investors have to report to Stock Exchange 
(BSE)/National Stock Exchange (NSE)/ Fixed Income Money Market & Derivatives Association 
(FIMMDA) reporting platforms. Currently FIMMDA has started F-TRAC which provides reporting 
facility of CD/CP and corporate bonds. RBI has mandated all Banks and institutions to report all 
CP/CD deals to F-TRAC system but the same is not true for corporate bonds. This fragmentation 
creates data mismatch.  
 Settlement – Till recently, investors have to settle their deals directly among themselves. Now 
the investors need to settle their deals through a clearing house.  
 Information Dissemination - Warehousing of information is very important for corporate bond 
investors. Centralized information regarding issue size and other important details like 
optionality, etc. should be publicly available. Such information is not easily available making it 
difficult for investors to source appropriate information. 
 Credit Migration History – It is necessary for bond investors to have information on credit 
migration history of a company in a centralized place. Though rating agencies provide such 
information individually whenever there is a Credit event, but it is difficult to source all 
information together to effectively price a corporate bond. 
 Corporate Bond Yield Curve – Unlike sovereign bonds, there is no corporate bond yield curve 
dissemination and hence id is difficult to price non-traded bonds in the portfolio. FIMMDA 
announces the credit spread for each rating class and each issuer class which is required to be 
used by investors. Since no credible study has been undertaken to test those credit spreads, it is 
difficult to use them effectively for pricing corporate bonds.  
 Probability of Default – Given the lack of credible data on corporate bonds, it is extremely 
difficult to find out the probability of default for corporate bonds.  
 
4. Challenging Issues: 
 
The most important issue is the availability of reliable information on bond issuances data. There is a 
need to standardize information and its publication in public domain in a manner that is useful for 
investors. The Patil Committee deliberated in detail on such necessity but data standardization is not yet 
fully achieved. Some interesting analysis of the bond issuance data of 2007-08 brings out lot of relevant 
issues that questions the very foundation of the corporate bond market in India. During 2007-08, as per 
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the data available with the author, there were 3772 issues by 213 companies and top 10 issuers 
accounted for 48% of the issue amount. More than 50% of issuances were from NBFCs in terms of the 
value of issuances (Table – 4). 
 
Table – 4 : Group-wise Issuance of Corporate Bonds 
Group Market Share (%) 
Bank  8.30% 
Corporate  18.85% 
FI  11.90% 
Housing Finance Co  6.44% 
NBFC  53.13% 
PD  1.37% 
Total 100.00% 
Source: Author’s private calculation 
 
Top 10 issuers were large companies and the largest issuer accounted for 10% of the issuances (value). 
Top 5 issuers accounted for about 33% of the issues Table – 5). The large issuers have issued multiple 
bonds/papers during the year. These companies had multiple issues during the year. There were only 18 
issues which had more than 100 investors and the rest were having less than 100 investors.  
 
Table – 5 : Top Issuers’ Market Share in Issuance of Corporate Bonds 
Issuer Share (%) Cumulative % 
Number of 
Issues 
Company 1  10.09 10.09 181 
Company 2  8.75 18.84 193 
Company 3  4.94 23.78 41 
Company 4  4.64 28.42 60 
Company 5  4.61 33.02 164 
Company 6  4.00 37.02 82 
Company 7  3.74 40.77 183 
Company 8  2.43 43.20 13 
Company 9  2.32 45.52 41 
Company 10  2.10 47.62 8 
Total 47.62  966 
Source: Author’s private calculation 
 
 
About 2288 issues (60% of the total issues) with about 34% of value had only single investors while 
more than 99% of the issues with 97% of issuance value had only upto 49 investors as required under 
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the legal provisions for private placement (Table – 6). So there has been concerted effort to issue the 
instruments through private placement route than the public issuances.   
 
Table – 6: Investor Participation in Issuances 
Investor Category  Issue Value (%)  Issue Numbers (%) 
Single Investor in an Issue  34.07 60.66 
2 to 5 investors in an issue  15.81 18.77 
6 to 10 investor in an issue  33.28 15.83 
11 to 20 investors  5.11 2.12 
21 to 49 investors  9.65 1.64 
More than 50  2.08 0.98 
Source: Author’s private calculation 
 
Issues upto 1 year of maturity accounted for 65% of the total issuance value while 2 to 3 months issues 
accounted for 27% and long term issues like 5 years and above accounted for about 26% of the issue 
amount. The 5 year segment was dominated by Banks and infrastructure companies. About 50% of the 
issues had maturity of 6 months or less (Table – 7). 
 
Table – 7 : Maturity profile of Issuances 
Category of Maturity   Market Share (%) Cumulative % 
Less than one week  0.34 0.34 
one week to 1 month   13.71 14.05 
1 month to 2 months   7.40 21.45 
2 months to 3 months   26.91 48.36 
3 months to 6 months   1.38 49.74 
6 months to 1 year   7.09 56.83 
1 year to 2 years   8.42 65.25 
2 years to 3 years   3.40 68.65 
3 years to 5 years   6.80 75.45 
5 years and above   24.55 100.00 
Source: Author’s private calculation 
 
The largest issuer company raised 82% of the funds through issuances on daily basis –by one issuance in 
a day while only 2% have been raised through 4 issues on the day (13% raised through 2 issues in a day 
and 3% was raised through 3 issues in a day).  Average maturity of the instruments issued were only 94 
days with average number of issuers per issue is only 2.  
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If the current market outcome follows the 2007-08 patterns, then we can safely comment that the 
market has a long way to go if we have to bring liquidity to the market. This type of market will be risky 
for investors as it misses the most important link – long term nature of the market. The granular data 
should be available in public domain to make comparative analysis of market maturity so that the bonds 
can be effectively priced by investor considering the risk involved in the market. Unavailability of 
information makes this more costly as any investor would expect higher return for the inefficient 
microstructure risk. 
 
5. Market Dynamics: 
 
Primary Issuances: The paper tries to understand the current market dynamics from both primary 
market issuances and secondary market trading point of views. In the issuance data publicly available, 
non-standardized names have created more than one record for the same issuer. For example, 
CHOLAMANDALAM INVESTMENT AND FIN. CO. LTD and   CHOLAMANDALAM INVESTMENT AND FIN. CO. 
LTD (CHOLAMANDALAM DBS FINANCE LTD) are counted as two different issuers while both refer to the 
same entity. The data was cleaned to group them as single issuer. During 2011-12, 252 companies raised 
funds through 2363 bond issuances. These companies issued only 18 perpetual bonds with average 
coupon of 12.15% (Max coupon 12.75% and min coupon 10.75%). Out of 18 perpetual bonds, only 5 
were rated “A” while others were rated “AA”. All these perpetual bonds had “Call” option at the expiry 
of 10th year subject to the approval of RBI. Financial companies (NBFCs included) accounted for a large 
chunk of issuers with 69% market share followed by infrastructure companies with 11% market share in 
number of issuances (Table – 8). 
 
Table – 8: Group-wise Distribution of Corporate Bonds (2011-12) 
Category/Type Number of issues Market Share (%) 
AGRO INDUSTRIES  8 0.34 
BANKS   113 4.78 
FINANCIAL COMPANIES  1636 69.23 
INFRASTRUCTURE   255 10.79 
MANUFACTURING 205 8.68 
SERVICES 117 1.23 
OTHERS 29 4.95 
Total 2363 100.00 
Source: NSDL, Author’s private computation 
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The issuance statistics shows that most of the issuances are upto 3 years of maturity (61%). The 
minimum maturity is 0.01 years and maximum is for 20 years with average issuance maturity of 4.14 
years. Bonds in 10 years maturity bucket accounted for about 9% (Table -9). Issuers preferred to issue 
Coupon bearing bonds (79% of bonds) though there were 488 zero coupon bonds (21% of bonds). 
 
Table -9 : Issuance of Bonds in terms of Maturity Bucket 
Maturity Bucket (Years) Issues 
COUPON 
BONDS 
ZERO COUPON 
BONDS Share (%) Cumulative share (%) 
1 100 77 23 4.23 4.23 
2 746 427 319 31.57 35.80 
3 603 490 113 25.52 61.32 
4 236 229 7 9.99 71.31 
5 200 191 9 8.46 79.77 
6 63 62 1 2.67 82.44 
7 55 54 1 2.33 84.77 
8 19 18 1 0.80 85.57 
9 12 9 3 0.51 86.08 
10 205 202 3 8.68 94.75 
15 94 89 5 3.98 98.73 
20 30 27 3 1.27 100.00 
  2363 1875 488 100.00   
Source: NSDL, Author’s private computation 
 
The issuance structure in terms in terms of number of issuances has remained more or less like 2007-08. 
The largest issuer had 5.6% of the total issues while Top 10 issuers were Finance companies with 35% of 
the issues. With regard to the Rating structure of the issues, the investment grade securities were 
dominant in the market and higher grade A-class securities (A, AA and AAA) accounted for 84% of the 
number of issuances. However, there was no information available on about 15% of the issuances with 
regard to their Rating class (this was after using the Trading data to extract Rating information which 
was missing in issuers data and vice versa). Below investment grade securities have little demand and 
preference. This may be so as we have concentrated on a particular year with high interest rate regime 
due to many domestic and international factors – European sovereign debt crisis, unstable equity 
markets, persistent domestic liquidity problems, dominance of high level of domestic sovereign 
borrowings, absence of a liquid risk transfer market like Credit Default Swap market, etc. From the 
information, we could make out that some of these issues were rated by Rating Agencies (as their 
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names have been given in the data) but the Rating of the issue is not provided in the data released in 
public domain. Only 8 issues were unrated issues in the data (Table – 10). 
 
Table – 10: Issuance in terms of Rating Class 
Instrument Rating Share (%) Cumulative Share (%) 
AAA 612 25.90 25.90 
AA 1240 52.48 78.37 
A  132 5.59 83.96 
BBB 15 0.63 84.60 
BB 7 0.30 84.89 
C 1 0.04 84.93 
NA 344 14.56 99.49 
UR 8 0.34 99.83 
P1 3 0.13 99.96 
P2 1 0.04 100.00 
Total 2363 100   
Source: NSDL, Author’s private computation 
 
The issuance concentrated in straight bonds (coupon and zero coupon bonds) though only 461 bonds 
had  floating rate structure  and bonds were linked to the performance of stock indices like NSE NIFTY or 
a particular underlying stock and 12 bonds were linked to Gold returns and 1 each were linked to Silver 
returns and NSE MIBOR (Mumbai Interbank Offer Rate). Only 2 bonds had convertible structure with 14 
bonds did not have information about their coupon. Out of 2363 issuances, only 488 bonds were zero 
coupon bonds. Major issuers were comfortable with bonds without put call options (1918 issues) while 
only 445 issues has embedded options out of which a majority had Call options giving benefit to the 
issuers to call the bond if the interest rate moves in favour of them.  There are some complex structure 
bonds issued during the year. Example of one of such complex structures is as follows: 
 
 If the Company achieve projected income & net profit during financial year 2010-11 & 2011-12, 
entire debentures be redeem by company by issuing fully paid equity shares of Rs.10 each 
(including premium) by 31st October,2012. In case shortfall in achievement is more than 
33.33%, entire subscription amount be repaid by company in 4 equal installment, due for 
payment by 31/10/2012,31/01/2013,30/04/2013 & 31/07/2013 at a price including subscription 
amount & redemption premium @20% p.a. compounded annually from the date of 
disbursement to date of subscription. In case shortfall in achievement is less than or upto 
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33.33%, subscription amount would be redeem proportionate to shortfall in 4 equal 
installments, due for payment by 31/10/2012, 31/01/2013,30/04/2013 & 31/07/2013 at a price 
including subscription amount & redemption premium @20% p.a. and balance subscription 
amount is converted into fully paid equity shares of Rs.10 each at a price including appropriate 
premium by 31/10/2012.    
 
During 2011-12, there were 1463 bond issuances for which coupon/implied yield could be extracted 
from the data in order to study behavior of cost of funding for various groups of issuers. Two records 
were dropped from the dataset as its coupon was stated to be 0.01% and 0.001% finally making the 
dataset to be 1461. The bond issuers were classified into various groups according to their business 
activity. It was found that Banks issued bonds with at the lowest average yield of 9.92% with an average 
maturity of 7.39 years while Services companies (mainly PSU units like Electricity Boards, etc.) could 
raise funds at cheaper rates at 10.07% and while infrastructure companies issued bonds with an average 
coupon of 13.03% with maturity of 4.09years. Surprisingly, infrastructure companies issued bonds with 
lesser maturity as against manufacturing companies and banks. This may be due to the fact most of the 
housing / building construction companies have raised funds during the year and due to the depressed 
market conditions prevailing in the market, these companies were perceived as more risky. Banks were 
considered the safest investment class by the investors in terms of the Relative Risk Indicator (Table-11). 
 
Table – 11: Maturity and Coupon profile of Issuances    
Type Issues Average Maturity (Years) Average Yield/Coupon (%) Relative Risk Indicator* 
AGRO  7 4.13 12.50% 3.03 
BANK  111 7.39 9.92% 1.34 
FIN  792 3.73 10.91% 2.93 
INFRA  224 4.09 13.03% 3.19 
MFG  199 6.05 10.92% 1.81 
OTH  28 4.51 11.60% 2.57 
SERVICES  100 5.52 10.07% 1.82 
Total 1461 5.06 11.28% 2.23 
Source: NSDL, Author’s private computation 
*Relative Risk Indicator = Coupon Rate*100/Maturity 
 
A granular analysis of the data shows that there is substantial difference in yields between bonds of 
various rating grades. The difference between yield of AAA and AA bonds in infrastructure companies 
and Banks were comparatively lower vis-à-vis other group of issuers. (Table -12)  
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Table – 12: Descriptive Statistics of Maturity and Coupon profile of Issuances across Issuer Groups 
Panel : AGRO COMPANIES 
Rating Issues 
Average 
Maturity (Years) 
Average 
Yield / 
Coupon  
Standard 
Deviation - 
Maturity 
Standard 
Deviation - 
Rate 
Maximum 
Maturity 
Maximum 
Yield / 
Coupon 
Minimum 
Maturity 
Minimum 
Yield / 
Coupon 
A 4 4.25 13.00% 0.65 0.00% 5.01 13.00% 3.50 13.00% 
NA 3 4.00 12.00% 1.00 0.00% 5.00 12.00% 3.00 12.00% 
Panel : BANKING COMPANIES 
AAA 93 4.39 9.42% 2.71 0.18% 15.01 9.75% 3.00 9.00% 
AA 13 10.39 9.66% 1.39 0.44% 15.01 10.50% 10.00 9.20% 
A 2 8.01 11.40% 2.83 0.00% 10.01 11.40% 6.01 11.40% 
NA 3 6.78 9.22% 3.08 0.45% 10.34 9.73% 5.01 8.90% 
PANEL : FINANCIAL COMPANIES 
AAA 135 5.12 9.96% 3.49 0.67% 15.01 12.00% 0.85 7.51% 
AA 542 3.92 10.67% 3.11 0.81% 15.02 13.25% 0.01 4.65% 
A 40 4.90 11.65% 3.81 1.16% 12.01 13.70% 0.25 9.10% 
BBB 10 4.66 12.60% 3.45 1.86% 10.01 14.40% 2.00 8.89% 
BB 3 4.53 12.08% 2.75 2.27% 7.00 14.50% 1.57 10.00% 
NA 58 4.77 10.08% 2.82 1.64% 10.01 12.75% 1.00 2.00% 
P1 3 0.93 10.54% 0.07 0.07% 1.00 10.62% 0.85 10.50% 
P2 1 1.00 9.70%     1.00 9.70% 1.00 9.70% 
PANEL : INFRASTRUCTURE COMPANIES 
AAA 102 4.32 9.68% 3.27 0.29% 15.01 11.00% 1.01 8.70% 
AA 35 7.75 9.86% 4.27 1.36% 17.01 12.75% 1.25 7.51% 
A 28 4.59 11.96% 0.91 2.07% 6.01 15.50% 3.00 5.60% 
BBB 3 1.43 14.83% 1.14 2.02% 2.17 16.00% 0.11 12.50% 
BB 3 3.50 16.67% 0.87 1.53% 4.51 18.00% 3.00 15.00% 
UR 1 2.99 12.50%     2.99 12.50% 2.99 12.50% 
NA 52 4.05 15.70% 3.32 3.49% 15.01 25.17% 1.01 10.00% 
PANEL : MANUFACTURING COMPANIES 
AAA 123 11.71 9.42% 4.27 0.21% 20.01 10.09% 4.00 9.00% 
AA 29 4.76 10.56% 3.34 0.90% 15.01 11.80% 0.99 8.00% 
A 22 5.44 12.45% 2.21 0.80% 10.01 14.56% 0.99 11.00% 
BBB 1 5.01 10.75%     5.01 10.75% 5.01 10.75% 
NA 24 3.35 11.43% 2.95 2.80% 15.01 16.65% 0.25 5.00% 
PANEL : SERVICES COMPANIES 
AAA 42 7.07 8.44% 5.14 1.69% 20.01 11.00% 1.01 6.00% 
AA 18 4.28 11.26% 1.71 0.58% 7.01 12.00% 1.00 9.90% 
A 19 5.50 11.41% 3.87 2.04% 15.01 13.40% 0.50 5.00% 
NA 21 5.21 9.14% 3.86 3.38% 15.01 18.00% 1.08 6.00% 
PANEL : OTHER DIVERSIFIED COMPANIES 
AAA 10 4.00 9.88% 1.06 0.22% 5.01 10.25% 3.00 9.60% 
AA 1 10.00 11.50%     10.00 11.50% 10.00 11.50% 
A 3 1.00 12.50% 0.00 2.00% 1.00 14.50% 1.00 10.50% 
NA 14 3.06 12.54% 1.41 4.97% 6.00 20.00% 1.00 6.50% 
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Rating is an important parameter for corporate bond risk premia. Higher rated bonds typically warrant 
lower coupon than low rated bonds. We have taken bonds for which rating information were available 
(1286 bonds) and tried to find out the structure of risk premia for each rating class. We found that bond 
investors determine price of bonds on the basis of rating information. It is also observed that market is 
obsessed with AAA and AA rated bonds as an investment class and hence the coupon is significantly 
lower as investors consider it safer investments. Other rating categories have reasonable risk premia 
(Table – 13).   
Table – 13: Bond Issuances - Rating Class and Coupon (sample  - 1285 bonds) – 2011-12 
Credit 
Ratin
g 
Issues 
Maturity 
(Years) 
Coupon 
/ Yield 
(%) 
Gilts 
Comparable 
Maturity 
(Year) 
Yield of 
Comparable 
Gilts (%) 
Risk 
Premia 
(%) 
 Premia over 
Rating Class (%) 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (F)= D - F (G)=D2-D1 
AAA 506 6.56 9.54% 6.5 8.40% 1.14%   
AA 638 4.32 10.62% 4.5 8.39% 2.23% 1.08% 
A 118 4.96 11.90% 5 8.40% 3.50% 1.27% 
BBB 14 3.99  12.95% 4 8.39% 4.56% 1.06% 
BB 6 4.01  14.38% 4 8.39% 5.99% 1.43% 
P1 3 0.93  10.54% 1 8.29% 2.25%   
P2 1 1.00  9.70% 1 8.29% 1.41%   
 Source: NSDL, Author’s private computation 
 
We have tried to understand if the market has been efficiently pricing the bond issuances by looking at 
the cost of funding. Cost of funding (coupon of the bond) will depend on many factors of risk - maturity, 
optionality, Rating class, type of issuer, etc. The regression equation used for finding out the 
relationships is: 
                                                ∑ 
 
    
                     
We did not find any significant relationship of coupon with optionality of the bond. The regression found 
that the Rating has significant relationship with coupon. Lower rating demanded higher coupon as the 
relationship shows (positive relationship as numerical value of lower rating is more than the numerical 
value of higher rating). The coupon/yield was having a negative relationship with the maturity. This 
means, the higher maturity bonds demanded relative lesser yield but lower maturity bonds demanded 
higher coupon/yield. This may be due to the fact that we had selected the year 2011-12 which 
witnessed unprecedented liquidity shortage and short term rates were higher than the long term rates 
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in the market which has been captured in the regression results. We used dummy variables in the 
regression for type of issuers (Table-14).   
 
Table – 14 : Regression Results (sample size: 1286) 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.10402         0.00534       19.46* <.0001  
Optionality -0.00063992      0.00079860       -0.80       0.4231 
Rating   0.00938      0.00039381       23.81* <.0001 
Maturity -0.00020481      0.00007649       -2.68*       0.0075 
BANKS -0.01803         0.00503       -3.59* 0.0003 
FINANCIAL COMPANIES -0.01385         0.00490       -2.89* 0.0039 
INFRASTRUCTURE -0.01432         0.00495       -2.87* 0.0042 
MANUFACTURING -0.01429         0.00497       -2.87* 0.0041 
SERVICES -0.01968         0.00502       -3.92*        <.0001 
OTHERS -0.01050         0.00555       -1.89*** 0.0587 
Adj R-Sq 0.3939    
* significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 10% 
 
We tried to create different panels for various Types/Groups of bond issuers to estimate the relationship 
of coupon with other variables among the various classes of bond issuers (Table – 15). 
Table – 15: Regression Results (Panels) 
Type 
Panels Obs 
ANOVA - 
F Value 
Dependent 
Mean RMSE 
Coff 
of Var 
Adj R-
Sq Intercept Optionality Rating Maturity 
BANKS 108 36.75* 0.0948 0.0025 2.66 0.50 
0.088  
[0.00093] 
(95.71)* 
-0.0011 
[0.00052] 
 (-2.08)** 
0.0074 
[0.0007] 
 (10.37)* 
-0.0004 
 [0.0001] 
(-3.83)* 
FINANCE 735 44.56* 0.10621     0.0087     8.24 0.15 
0.0911 
[0.0027] 
 (33.25)* 
0.0019 
[0.0011] 
 (1.70)*** 
0.0058 
[0.0005] 
 (11.51)* 
0.0001 
[0.0001] 
(0.51) 
INFRA 171 64.83* 0.1030 0.0118 5.52 0.76 
0.0912 
[0.0054] 
 (17.05)* 
-0.0029 
[0.0025] 
 (-1.17) 
0.0132 
[0.0010] 
 (13.61)* 
-0.0009 
[0.00026] 
 (-3.55)* 
MFG 175 188.79* 0.09997 0.0055 5.02 0.82 
0.0839 
[0.0036] 
 (22.83)* 
-0.0018 
[0.0015] 
 (-1.20) 
0.0134 
[0.0007] 
 (18.30)* 
0.00003 
[0.0001] 
(0.27) 
SERVICES 79 16.12* 0.09800 0.172 17.50 0.37 
0.0649 
[0.0115] 
 (5.64)* 
0.0017 
[0.0048] 
 (0.35) 
0.0167 
[0.0025] 
 (6.53)* 
0.00025 
[0.00044] 
 (0.56) 
OTHERS 14 6.89* 0.1056 0.009 8.59 0.58 
0.12148 
[0.062] 
(1.96)*** 
-0.0139 
[0.0235] 
(-0.59) 
0.0109 
[0.0052] 
(2.09)** 
-0.0014 
[0.0029] 
(-0.50) 
* significant at 1% , ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 10% 
Note: Numbers in (…) parenthesis are t-stat of the estimates and […] are standard error 
 
In case of Banks and Finance companies, we found that the embedded optionality was significant at 5% 
and 10% level respectively for determining the coupon/yield rate while for other groups, the same was 
not significant. However, for Banks, the relationship was negative while for Finance companies the 
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relationship was positive. For Banks, higher coupon was paid for embedded bonds (Numerical value =1 
in regression) while for Finance companies higher coupon was paid for non-embedded bonds 
(Numerical value =2 in regression). The results are justified because banks were considered safe bet for 
investment while Finance companies were considered relatively more risky and hence higher coupon 
were demanded by investors. Since bank bonds were considered safer assets and can be compared with 
sovereign securities (given the very low and negligible rate of Bank failures in India), any embedded 
option (mostly giving call rights to issuers) were considered more risky in comparison to bonds having no 
embedded options. Rating was found to be significant and the directions were same for all groups. With 
regard to maturity, it was found that the yield was indirectly related to maturity for Banks and infra 
companies (where it was found to be significant) validating our earlier findings of such relation due to 
high liquidity shortage in the market. 
 
Secondary Market: Corporate bond trading in the secondary market during 2011-12 is considered for 
analysis in this paper. Secondary market trading in corporate bonds is done in OTC environment but 
these trades are reported to multiple platforms – NSE, BSE and FIMMDA. Currently FIMMDA runs T-
TRAC platform that facilitates reporting of OTC deals in corporate bonds, CPs and CDs. However, RBI has 
mandated reporting of trades in CPs and CDs through T-TRAC platform but traders have choice of 
reporting of corporate bonds deals to BSE or NSE if the deal is done through brokers and if the traders 
are directly dealing, then they can report the deals to F-TRAC.  Settlement (T+2) is done through one of 
the clearing corporations of the Exchanges. The reported deals data have many inherent problems – 
non-standardized prices and yield reporting, information on Credit rating, names of the issuing 
companies, etc.  The corporate bonds deals are concentrated in few issuers. Top 10 issuers account for 
about 56.50% of the total number of trades. In Top 10 category, we found that 9 companies belong to 
Government sector and only 1 was a private company (Table – 16).  
 
Table – 16: Trading Incidence of Corporate Bonds - Transactions 
 Top “n” Issuers  Market Share (%) 
Top 1 9.74% 
Top 5 38.66% 
Top 10 56.50% 
Top 15 64.87% 
Top 20 70.20% 
   Source: NSDL; Author’s private calculation 
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In order to understand how markets perceive risk while trading the bonds, we found that Banks are 
perceived as less risky and financial companies are considered relatively more risky while comparing 
their YTMs. In terms of their relative riskiness measured in terms of Yield to Time to Maturity ratio, 
Service Providing companies scored higher as the data contained many firms which are owned by 
Sovereign States (like Electricity boards, etc.). Manufacturing firms and Banks were close to each other. 
Infrastructure firms and other diversified groups like holding companies were considered very risky in 
terms of investment. The same result was also found in issuance structure of corporate bonds (Table -
17). 
 
Table – 17: Trading Behaviour -  Relative Riskiness of Issuer Groups 
TYPE 
Number Average 
Tenor 
Weighted 
Avg. Yield 
G-Sec Base Yield 
(FIMMDA) 
Spread 
over G-Sec 
G-Sec yield 
(CCIL)  
Relative 
Riskiness 
BANK  1 6.29 9.48 8.49 0.99 8.38 1.51 
FINANCE 2 5.24 10.00 8.49 1.46 8.37 1.91 
INFRA  3 4.41 9.85 8.48 1.34 8.36 2.23 
MFG  4 6.73 9.56 8.55 1.01 8.41 1.42 
OTH  5 3.42 9.78 8.44 1.34 8.33 2.86 
SERVICES  6 11.03 10.05 8.65 1.41 8.50 0.91 
AVERAGE  6.19 9.79 8.52 1.26 8.39 1.81 
Source: Source: NSDL; Author’s private calculation 
Note: G-Sec Base Yield is the appropriate yield of comparable Government securities incorporated by FIMMDA at the time of 
data release; G-Sec yield is the comparable yield of appropriate Government securities out of estimated sovereign yield curve 
(YTM) of CCIL 
 
To understand the dynamics of secondary market trading in corporate bonds, we had to clean the data 
set which contained insufficient information for many trades – like missing Credit Rating information, 
negative yield, wrong price (some bonds were reported traded price of more than 200). During 2011-12, 
16296 valid trades were reported to various platforms. There are apparent duplicate trades reported for 
the same securities in multiple platforms which were cleaned for analysis. This has to be done physically 
and after ascertaining if the same was a duplicate trade. The major trades were for fixed coupon bonds 
(16064 deals) and only a few deals were for floating coupon bonds (232 deals). We dropped 733 records 
for incomplete information though every effort was made to collect information from issuance data 
using the ISIN number as the key (like getting Rating information from issuance table for some bonds for 
which the same was missing in trading data). We had 15563 records finally with 40159 deals. However, 
we found that no systematic record exists for Rating Migration incorporation in the data for trading. The 
data cleaning was the most painful exercise for this study. 
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Trading in corporate bonds concentrated in AAA rated bonds which accounted 89% (81% of deals – 
multiple deals in same bond) and 99% of the deals were in the first 3 A group rated securities (A, AA and 
AAA). We found that while trading, the market fairly prices the rating information even though the 
trading liquidity is very low in most of other rating class. To our surprise, we found that yield in BBB class 
of bonds were lower that A rated bonds. This may be possible due to two reasons: (a) the trading might 
have happened on days when the general yields in the market were relatively lower and (b) since the 
market is an OTC one, the dealing parties might have agreed to do the deal at that yield due to many 
other considerations. However, no specific conclusion can be drawn from the said yield abnormalities as 
the market is highly illiquid for BBB rated bonds vis-à-vis A rated bonds. The lower rated bonds (below 
investment class BB rated bonds), though only few trades happened, had to offer significant yield to 
investors (Table – 18).  
 
Table – 18: Trading Behaviour - Rating Class and Spread  
  Tenor 
Weighted 
Avg. Yield 
G-Sec Base 
Yield 
Spread 
over G-Sec 
G-sec 
yields Spreads 
Bonds 
Traded 
Spread 
over Class 
AAA 5.8119 9.6063 8.5064 1.0992 8.3824 1.2239 
11410 
(32497)   
AA  4.2947 10.2400 8.4750 1.6993 8.3524 1.8877 
301 
(5328) 0.6337 
A  10.3145 10.4489 8.6260 1.7986 8.4727 1.9762 
1044 
(2178) 0.2089 
BBB 7.1802 10.0858 8.4486 1.6372 8.3834 1.7023 
90  
(120) -0.3632 
BB  3.2962 14.3868 8.4458 4.7169 8.2777 6.1091 
18 
 (36) 4.3010 
Average 6.1795 10.9536 8.5003 2.1902 8.3737 2.5798    1.1951 
Note: number in parenthesis gives the number of deals 
 
With regard to trading behaviour of individual bonds, we found that few bonds were having relatively 
higher level of liquidity purely on the basis of their high incidence of trading. During the year, 1803 ISINs 
were traded with 40159 deals. One bond was traded on 180 days during the year (238 trading days in 
our sample). The most liquid ISIN in terms of number of deals was traded on 142 days during the year. 
The study also found that there are certain sporadic trades on few ISINs. Few bonds were traded in large 
numbers but only on a single day. One ISIN was found trading on only 3 trading days with total 103 deals 
on the bonds. These sporadic deals may have been arranged deals between participants for certain 
specific purpose like balance sheet cleaning and moving the bonds to another counter party or group of 
counter parties which is likely to hold it till maturity (Table – 19).  
 
gcnath@hotmail.com 24 
 
Table – 19: Liquidity Behaviour - Incidence of Trading   
ISIN of the Bond   Days Traded Total No Of Trades during the Year 
INE020B08591  142 1574 
INE134E08DQ6  149 1572 
INE062A08058  180 1305 
INE020B08641  89 1279 
INE941D07125  120 979 
INE134E08EA8  66 751 
INE053F09HR2  90 709 
INE134E08DS2  108 671 
INE134E08DR4  102 553 
INE340M08012  79 466 
INE136E07FB0  1 65 
INE915D07LP7  3 103 
INE915D07NS7  1 63 
INE915D07IZ2  1 46 
INE915D07NC1  1 39 
INE915D07MM2  1 29 
Total 238 40159 
 
We tried to understand if the yield of a bond is related to parameters like Rating, structures like Fixed or 
Floating, type of issuer, etc. We tried to estimate the regression model: 
 
                                           ∑   
 
                  ….(2) 
 
Table – 20: Regression Results (sample size – 15563) 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 8.61709         0.05475      157.38*       <.0001 
COUPON TYPE 0.79938         0.04387       18.22*       <.0001 
Rating class 0.46314         0.00850       54.49*       <.0001 
TENOR -0.02165         0.00116      -18.60*       <.0001 
BANKS -0.06533         0.00517      -12.64*       <.0001 
FINANCIAL COMPANIES 0.00009          0.01467        0.01       0.9948 
INFRASTRUCTURE -0.00174         0.01098       -0.16       0.8739 
MANUFACTURING -0.07343         0.00759       -9.68*       <.0001 
SERVICES -0.01603         0.00920       -1.74***       0.0814 
Adjusted R-square 0.2578    
* significant at 1% , ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 10% 
 
While estimating the above regression equation, we have used dummy variables for type of bond 
issuers and Other diversified group was considered as Type 1 as it contained trades of bonds of only a 
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single issuer. The relationship between yield and bond structure (fixed or floating) was found to be 
positive – higher yield was expected for bonds with floating coupon (higher numerical rank for floating 
rate bonds=2 and fixed coupon bonds = 1). Investors demanded a higher premia for taking investment 
decision on bonds having floating rate which is fair. The relation between Rating class and yield was also 
found to be rational as higher yield were demanded on bonds with lower rating (higher numerical value 
assigned: AAA for 1, AA for 2, A for 3, BBB for 4 and BB for 5).  Yield and Tenor showed a negative 
relation which was intuitively not correct (Table – 20). 
 
 
We also created different Panels in terms of Type of issuers and looked at if yield is related to other 
variables in a rational manner across various types of bond issuers. For all cases, bond structure (floating 
or fixed coupon) was found to be significant except in case of Banks. As investors consider banks to be 
relatively less risky as close to sovereign structure (as incidence of actual bank failures in India is 
negligible), they did not differentiate between floating rate bonds and fixed coupon bonds. Rating has 
been found to be significant and in the right direction/sign for all class of bonds except for bonds issued 
by Services sector. Maturity was found to be related to coupon but the sign was found to be rational 
(Table – 21).  
 
 
Table-21: Regression Result (Panel) 
Type Panels Obs 
ANOVA - 
F Value 
Dependent 
Mean RMSE 
Coff 
of Var 
Adj R-
Sq Intercept 
Coupon 
Structure Rating Maturity 
DW 
Stat 
SERVICES  338 13.49* 9.78 0.25 2.54 0.10 
8.26 
(32.00)* 
1.48 
(5.94)* 
0.07 
(1.57)  
-0.01 
 (-1.32) 
1.09 
FINANCIAL 
COMPANIES  6884 718.77* 10.00 0.80 7.96 0.24 
7.78 
(99.06)* 
1.48 
 (20.21)* 
0.58 
(39.19)* 
-0.025 
(-12.21)* 
0.93 
INFRA  1723 241.83* 9.85 0.59 5.95 0.30 
10.02 
(69.18)* 
-0.98 
 (-6.94)* 
0.77 
(26.76)* 
-0.01 
 (-3.13)*  
0.62 
MFG  3350 167.50* 9.56 0.48 4.59 0.13 
8.54 
(58.05)* 
0.91 
 (6.21)* 
0.21 
(16.78)* 
-0.02 
(-13.98) 
1.12 
BANKS  2695 100.85* 9.48 0.42 4.43 0.10 
9.27 
(170.56)* 
-0.06 
 (-1.11) 
0.26 
(16.96)* 
-0.01 
 (-4.86)* 
1.18 
* significant at 1% , ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 10% 
 
 
6. Default Probability of Corporate Bonds: Default risk of bonds is very important for investors in 
order to efficiently price the bond. In India, very little information is available on these areas.  
Credit spread information is provided by FIMMDA on daily basis for various rating category of 
bonds as well as for various category of issuers. The credit yield curves are neither estimated nor 
any corporate bond index is available in public domain. If spot yield curves for corporate bonds 
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are made available, risk neutral probability of default can be easily estimated from these yield 
curve as sovereign spot yield curves are available from CCIL and NSE. From the trading 
information of corporate bonds (used only AAA bonds for estimation), we explored to estimate 
the risk neutral probability of default. Using the traded bonds, we estimated the spot rates using 
Nelson-Siegel functional form :  
                (  
 (
  
 )
 
 
)      
(
  
 ) 
The spot curves (using only AAA bonds) estimated from this exercise were used to estimate the one 
period forward rates at every year interval. We also used the CCIL spot rate param values for 
Government bond market to estimate the spot curve for sovereign securities market which are used to 
estimate the one period forwards at every year interval. These forwards are used to estimate the 
probability of survival. The probability of a bond to survive in one year (not getting into default) is given 
by 
 
                        
      
      
 
 
Where r is the sovereign forward yield for the term and k is the corporate forward yield of the same 
term. The probability of default is calculated as (1-Prob of Survival). The cumulative probability of 
default is estimated as: 
                         
 
 
We estimated the same upto 10 years for 2011-12. We found that the probability of default is higher at 
the shorter end and the same falls at the longer end (Table – 22). The reason may be the uncertainty 
existing in the short term with respect to liquidity and other macroeconomic factors might be 
warranting higher probability of default to be factored in yields. We considered upto 10 years as bonds 
beyond 10 years are hardly traded in the market. Average issuances are also less than 10 years in India 
during 2011-12 (5.23 years).  
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Table -22: Probability of Default  
  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 
Mean 1.46% 1.42% 1.38% 1.33% 1.28% 1.23% 1.18% 1.13% 1.09% 1.05% 
Std dev 0.29% 0.25% 0.21% 0.18% 0.16% 0.15% 0.14% 0.13% 0.13% 0.12% 
Max 2.47% 2.04% 1.91% 1.89% 1.85% 1.78% 1.68% 1.58% 1.48% 1.41% 
Mean 0.93% 0.92% 0.86% 0.81% 0.78% 0.74% 0.72% 0.70% 0.67% 0.66% 
Median 1.39% 1.37% 1.35% 1.32% 1.27% 1.23% 1.19% 1.14% 1.09% 1.05% 
Cummulative Probability of Default 
Mean 1.46% 2.86% 4.21% 5.48% 6.69% 7.84% 8.93% 9.96% 10.94% 11.87% 
Std dev 0.29% 0.53% 0.71% 0.86% 0.99% 1.10% 1.19% 1.27% 1.34% 1.41% 
Max 2.47% 4.44% 6.17% 7.72% 9.17% 10.55% 12.02% 13.38% 14.64% 15.81% 
Mean 0.93% 1.84% 2.74% 3.60% 4.36% 5.07% 5.75% 6.41% 7.04% 7.65% 
Median 1.39% 2.77% 4.06% 5.32% 6.53% 7.66% 8.74% 9.80% 10.77% 11.71% 
Source: CCIL, Author’s own calculation 
 
7. Corporate Credit Spread: The spot curves derived for both corporate and Government securities 
are used to calculate the credit spread for each maturity term. Daily average credit spread was 
obtained for 2011-12 (238 trading days) (Chart -1). 
 
 
 
The spread varied between 87bps to 187bps (Table -23). The average spread was 138bps and the 
median spread is 135bps.   
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Chart - 1: Movement of Credit_Spread (2011-12) 
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Table – 23: Descriptive Statistics of Credit Spread (AAA bonds) 
Mean 0.013773 
Standard Error 0.000113 
Median 0.013553 
Standard Deviation 0.001738 
Sample Variance 3.02E-06 
Kurtosis 0.448757 
Skewness 0.194702 
Range 0.009987 
Minimum 0.008695 
Maximum 0.018682 
Count 238 
 
While looking at the relationship between the credit spread of the liquidity measured by volume and/or 
number of deals during the day for the AAA bonds, we did not find any significant relationship between 
them – either individually or volume of trades and number of deals together. The R-square was very low 
at 0.033. The credit spread for 2011-12 for AAA securities were close to a normal distribution (Table – 24 
and Chart -2).  
 
                            
Table – 24: Goodness-of-Fit Tests for Normal Distribution 
Test Statistics p Value 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov   D 0.07429 Pr > D <0.010 
 Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 0.33396 P > W-Sq <0.005 
Anderson-Darling A-Sq 1.68439 Pr > A-Sq <0.005 
 
 
 
Chart - 2: Daily Credit Spread (AAA Bonds) - 2011-12
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We tried to find out if the credit spreads depend on past information on credit spreads. We found that 
lags beyond 2 days are not significant and they do not change the R-square of the estimated equation 
significantly. Hence we restricted our estimation to only 2 lags. We also considered the change in the 
slope of the sovereign yield curve to see if the same has any effect on spread.  The slope parameter was 
estimated as the difference between the 10 year and 3-months sovereign spot yields. We found that the 
Adjusted R-square dropped very marginally (from 79.73% to 79.71%).  We tested the regression 
equation: 
 
                                                 …..(3) 
 
The residuals were tested for their behavior and found to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 
0.00077 (close to 0.1%). The Goodness of Fit tests for normal distribution for residuals were found to be 
acceptable (Table – 25 and Chart - 3). 
 
Table – 25: Goodness-of-Fit Tests for Normal Distribution for Residuals 
Test Statistics p Value 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov   D 0.06972 Pr > D <0.010 
 Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 0.30678 P > W-Sq <0.005 
Anderson-Darling A-Sq 1.83389 Pr > A-Sq <0.005 
 
 
The credit spread equation above was estimated as dependent variable with lag credit spreads (upto 2 
lags) as independent variables. We found that lag credit spreads (upto 2 lags) are significant (Table – 26). 
Chart - 3: Daily Credit Spread (AAA Bonds) - Residuals
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The Durbin-Watson statistics was higher at above 2. Market used the past spreads to price the credit 
spread they would charge on corporate bonds while trading in the market.  
         
 
Table – 26: Regression Results (Spread on lag Spread) 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.00127 0.00043 2.92*       0.0053 
Spread (Lag 1) 0.61466         0.06180       9.95*       <.0001 
Spread (Lag 2)  0.29038 0.06115        4.75*       <.0001 
Slope 0.00629 0.00746 0.84 0.4003 
Adjusted R-square 0.7971 DW 2.121  
Root MSE           0.00077185; Coeff Var             5.61542 
* indicates significant at 1% 
 
8. Conclusion: 
 
The Indian corporate bonds issuance and trading data provides interesting information with regard to 
various parameters. The data handling is a challenging exercise as in many cases the important 
information for efficient pricing of bonds is missing in the data available in public domain. With regard to 
issuance and trading, AAA bonds dominated the market. With regard to their issuances, it is found that 
the coupon offered on AAA bond issuances is significantly lower as investors consider it as good as 
sovereign securities with only 12bps risk premia. We found that other rating categories have reasonable 
risk premia when they are issued to investors. The market does not trade much of lower rated bonds 
like A/BBB/BB. The secondary market is generally illiquid. We found that while trading, the market fairly 
prices the rating information even though the trading liquidity is very low in most of other rating class. 
Bonds issued by Banks were considered most safe investment by investors and investors were willing to 
pay for the same. We found that the probability of default is higher at the shorter end and the same falls 
at the longer end. The reason may be the uncertainty existing in the short term with respect to liquidity 
and other macroeconomic factors might be warranting higher probability of default to be factored in 
yields. The study also found that credit spreads behave in a rational manner. The market participants are 
using the past credit spread information upto 2 trading days lags to price the spread they would demand 
on the corporate bonds while investing in them.  
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